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 A B S T R A C T  
This study aims to reveal the effect of corporate governance on the relationship be-
tween corporate social responsibility disclosure and corporate value. The data were
taken from sustainability reports, annual reports, and financial statements of compa-
nies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange from sector one to seven in a row during
2009-2010. This study replicates the research by Rustiarini (2010). It shows that
corporate social responsibility and corporate governance disclosure, both simultane-
ously and partially, have significant effect on corporate value. Corporate governance
as a moderating variable does not affect the relationship between corporate social re-
sponsibility disclosure and corporate value. Of 28.9 percent of variation in corporate
value is explained by variables of corporate social responsibility disclosure, corporate
governance, and interaction variables used in the model, while the rest of 71.1 percent
must be caused by other variables. For further studies, the researchers could take
longer period with other variables (i.e. variables of corporate governance, return on
assets, cash holdings, dividend payout ratio, and investment opportunity) and use
another index (i.e. corporate governance index issued by the Indonesian Institute for
Corporate Governance (IICG). 
 
  A B S T R A K  
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengungkapkan pengaruh corporate governance pada
hubungan antara pengungkapan tanggung jawab sosial perusahaan dan nilai perusa-
haan. Data diambil dari laporan keberlanjutan, laporan tahunan, dan laporan keuan-
gan perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia dari sektor 1-7 berturut-turut 
periode 2009-2010. Penelitian ini mereplikasi penelitian oleh Rustiarini (2010). Ha-
silnya menunjukkan bahwa tanggung jawab sosial perusahaan dan pengungkapan 
tata kelola perusahaan, baik secara simultan maupun parsial, berpengaruh signifikan
terhadap nilai perusahaan. Corporate governance sebagai variabel moderasi tidak
mempengaruhi hubungan antara pengungkapan tanggung jawab sosial perusahaan 
dan nilai perusahaan. Dari 28,9 persen dari variasi dalam nilai perusahaan dijelaskan 
oleh variabel pengungkapan tanggung jawab sosial perusahaan, tata kelola perusa-
haan, dan variabel interaksi yang digunakan dalam model, sedangkan sisanya 71,1
persen harus disebabkan oleh variabel lain. Untuk penelitian lebih lanjut, para peneliti 
bisa mengambil jangka waktu yang lebih lama dengan variabel lain (misalnyal tata
kelola perusahaan, return on asset, posisi kas, dividend payout ratio, dan peluang
investasi) dan menggunakan indeks lain (yaitu indeks tata kelola perusahaan yang 
dikeluarkan oleh Indonesian Institute Corporate Governance (IICG). 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A company is established to achieve a clear pur-
pose. This purpose can be divided into two; eco-
nomic purpose and social purpose (Fuad et al. 2000: 
22). Economic purpose realates to the company 
efforts to maintain its existence while social pur-
pose relates to how the company can fulfill its re-
sponsibilities or obligations to the parties which 
support the company's existence. In social purpose, 
the company is expected to pay attention to the 
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desire of investors, employees, providers of pro-
duction factors, and general public. 
So far, most of the companies have adopted 
various ways in order to make profit or maximum 
profit without considering the impact on natural 
and social environment. Profit is seen as a measure 
of the success of the company. If the income in-
creases, the corporate value will also increase. It 
cannot be ignored, but the profit is not the only 
indicator to assess the success of the company. The 
company's attention to the environment in operat-
ing is also an indicator of success. The company 
does not only make exploitation but also update, 
even increase the quality of the environment 
around it. Corporate responsibility to both natural 
and social environment can be an added value for 
the company in the eyes of both the investors and 
prospective ones. 
For example, Mackey and Barney (2007) sug-
gested that investors may have interests other than 
maximizing their wealth, i.e. to socially responsible 
investing. Research by Almilia and Vitello (2007) 
states that company with good Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) activities will have good in-
crease on its stock price. Jo and Harjoto (2011) 
found that CSR engagement positively affects cor-
porate value. The research by Godfrey et al. (2009) 
explains that CSR is a method of potential value 
creation in facing several types of negative events. 
However, Nurlela and Islahuddin (2008) stated that 
CSR activity is not one of the factors that affect the 
corporate value. 
This study refers to previous research con-
ducted by Rustiarini (2010) by re-using the corpo-
rate governance (CG) as a moderating variable. CG 
is re-used in the research because the activities and 
the disclosure of CSR are one of the implementa-
tions of good corporate governance (GCG). CG is 
expected to strengthen the effect of CSR disclosure 
on the corporate value. Compared to the previous 
studies, the difference lies in (1) the sample used, 
(2) corporate governance indicator, and (3) items of 
CSR disclosure indicator. 
In this occasion, the researcher tries to reveal 
(1) the effect of CSR disclosure on corporate value, 
(2) the effect of corporate governance on corporate 
value, and (3) the effect of CSR disclosure on cor-
porate value with corporate governance as mod-
erating variable. The results of this study are ex-
pected to provide an overview and understanding 
about the effect of CSR disclosure on corporate 
value and the effect of corporate governance on 
the relationship between CSR disclosure and cor-
porate value. 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HY-
POTHESIS 
a. Signaling Theory and Market Value 
Between the manager or agent and the investor or 
prospective investor, (the stakeholders and the 
shareholders), there is information asymmetry: the 
manager knows more information about the activi-
ties and the performance of the firm than the inves-
tor or prospective investor. Signaling theory dis-
cusses how managers convey the information to 
investors or potential investor about the activities 
undertaken and the conditions experienced by the 
firm today. Such information must be accurate and 
dilivered timely so that it can be relevant and reli-
able for the investors in making investment deci-
sions. CSR is one of the information that must be 
disclosed by the firm. This information will be a 
signal to investors about how the firm's concern for 
the social and natural environment where the firm 
operates. 
Corporate value is the market value of firm’s 
debt and equity securities outstanding, (Keown, 
2004). The corporate value is very important be-
cause high corporate value will be followed by 
higher shareholder wealth (Gapensi Bringham, 
1996), the higher the share prices the higher the 
share value of the company. The high corporate 
value is an expectation of the owner of the com-
pany, because high value also shows higher share-
holder wealth. The corporate value can be proxied 
by "Tobin's Q" indicator (Jo and Harjoto, 2011): 
 
b. Agency Theory 
Agency relationship is a contract in which one or 
more persons (the principal or owner) hire another 
person (the agent or manager) to perform some 
services on their behalf which involves delegating 
some decision making authority to the agent (Jen-
sen and Meckling, 1976). This theory emphasizes 
the separation between ownership (principal) and 
management (agent). This separation usually 
makes a difference in interests between the two 
sides that leds to the problem of agency. Manager 
will usually utilize information asymmetry which 
occurs due to the separation of this power for its 
own interest. 
Corporate governance is a solution to over-
come the problem of agency. Good corporate gov-
ernance can explain and separate roles and respon-
sibilities of each agent clearly, align interests be-
tween the agent and the owner, and provide moni-
toring of any executive decision making (Pearce 
and Robinson, 2008:50). Indicators used to measure 
corporate governance are managerial ownership, 
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institutional ownership, board size, and the propor-
tion of independent directors. 
 
c. Corporate Social Responsibility 
Disclosure and Corporate Value 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a commit-
ment of the company, as much as possible, to re-
duce the impact caused by the company operations 
on the natural environment and social surround-
ings and to increase or improve the condition of the 
environment and the welfare of the surrounding 
community through discretionary business prac-
tices and contributions of corporate resources. In-
formation on the CSR disclosure can be a competi-
tive advantage of the firm which is expected to be 
able to increase the corporate value. 
According to Almilia and Vitello (2007) and 
Rustiarini (2010), companies that have good envi-
ronmental and social performance will either be re-
sponded positively by investors through increased 
stock price. If a company has poor environmental 
and social performance, it will appear the doubts of 
investors and be responded negatively through the 
decline in its stock price. The research result by 
Mackey and Barney (2007), suggests that some in-
vestors may have interests other than maximizing 
their wealth in making investment decisions. While 
the findings of the study by Godfrey et al. (2009) also 
show that CSR, particularly investments aimed at 
secondary stakeholders, describes a method of po-
tential value creation for shareholders in facing sev-
eral types of negative events. 
Research by Rossi (2009), taking the sample of 
non-financial companies in Brazil, shows that the 
adoption of policy by a manager who focuses on 
social responsibility increases the corporate value. 
Jo and Harjoto (2011) also revealed that CSR en-
gagement affects positively on the corporate value. 
However, there are also researches who consider 
that CSR has no effect on the corporate value. Nur-
lela and Islahuddin (2008) found that the imple-
mentation of CSR in the company is not a factor 
that determines whether the corporate value is 
good or bad. 
Based on the result of this sudy, the hypothesis 
can be put forward: 
H1: Corporate social responsibility disclosure af-
fects the corporate value 
 
d. Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Value 
Forum for Corporate Governance in Indonesia or 
FCGI (2001) formulates corporate governance (CG), 
i.e. a set of rules governing the relationship be-
tween shareholders and stakeholders (internal and 
external) relating to their rights and obligations, or 
in other words, a system that regulates and controls 
of the company. The purpose of CG is to create 
added value for all stakeholders. 
Company must be managed properly so as not 
to cause negative impact on the company, social, 
and natural environments. Good Corporate Gov-
ernance (GCG) will guide the company towards 
longer sustainability, and this becomes a signal to 
investors that the company is worthy to be a long-
term investment place. Thus, the model of Corpo-
rate Governance (CG) is expected to be able to in-
crease the corporate value. The researcher uses four 
indicators to measure corporate governance, i.e. 
managerial ownership, institutional ownership, 
board size, and the proportion of independent di-
rectors. 
Researches by Thomsen (2004), Coleman 
(2007), Herawaty (2008), Susanti (2010), Rustiarini 
(2010), Ammann et al. (2011), and Shil (2011) state 
that corporate governance (CG) affects the corpo-
rate value, even internationally it shows that better 
corporate governance practices are reflected in the 
higher market value statistically and economically 
significant (Ammann et al. 2011). Herdinata (2007) 
showed that CG has negative effect on corporate 
value. 
Several studies have shown that managerial 
and institutional ownership affect corporate value. 
The findings of Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2008) and 
Ruan et al. (2009) show that the increase in the 
stock ownership by manager is beneficial for the 
corporate value because it connects the interests of 
insiders (managers) and shareholders so that the 
decision making can run better. On the other hand, 
Murwaningsari (2009) revealed that the ownership 
by institutions can be an effective monitoring tool 
for the company. Research by Zeitun (2009) shows 
positive relationship between institutional owner-
ship and corporate value. 
The research result differences occur in meas-
uring the effect of board size on corporate value. 
Lehn et al. (2004) revealed that larger boards also 
have greater collective information, and therefore 
will result in higher performance. Shil (2011) ar-
gued that smaller boards reduce the possibility of 
free riding and improve individual accountability. 
Guest (2009) argued that board size has negative 
impact on company performance. Meanwhile, To-
pak (2011) even found no relationship between 
board size and company performance. 
The proportion of independent directors also 
has an effect on corporate value. Raheja (2005) re-
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vealed that outsider directors are more independ-
ent and provide better insight and monitoring, but 
lack of information about the activities of the com-
pany. Meanwhile, Dah et al. (2010) showed that an 
increase in the percentage of outsider leads to the 
decrease in the corporate value. 
Based on the results of these studies, the hy-
pothesis can be put forward: 
H2: Corporate Governance affects the corporate 
value. 
 
e. Corporate Governance, Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility Disclosure, and Corporate Value 
The implementation of CSR is a manifestation of 
corporate governance principles. One of the corpo-
rate governance principles is responsibility, a prin-
ciple which is more related to stakeholder-driven, 
explicitly expresses concern over the interested 
parties in the existence of the company. One of the 
implementation of responsibility principle states 
that company must fulfill its social responsibility, 
i.e. concern about the community and the environ-
ment, especially around the company by making 
adequate planning and implementation. 
Rustiarini (2010) stated that the implementation 
of good corporate governance has led the company 
to implement CSR thereby increasing the corporate 
value. Ammann et al. (2011) found a strong and 
positive relationship between the level of corporate 
governance and corporate social behavior and cor-
porate value, but this relationship only applies to 
companies with good corporate governance struc-
ture. Jo and Harjoto (2011) found that CSR is trig-
gered by the company’s characteristics and corpo-
rate governance and monitoring mechanisms that 
will ultimately affect the corporate value. 
Based on the research findings, the hypothesis 
can be put forward: 
H3: Corporate Governance affects the relationship 
between CSR disclosure and the corporate value 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
a. Research Design 
This study aims to investigate the effect of corpo-
rate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure on the 
corporate value with corporate governance (CG) as 
a moderating variable. CSR disclosure is an inde-
pendent variable, i.e. variable that affects the cor-
porate value as dependent variable, while CG acts 
as a moderating variable, i.e. variable that strength-
ens or weakens the relationship between CSR and 
corporate value. This moderating variable is also 
referred to as the second independent variable. 
Managerial ownership, institutional ownership, 
board size, and the proportion of independent di-
rectors are proxy representing CG variable. 
Corporate Social Responsibility Index (CSRI), 
based on the existing indicators in the GRI G3 Sus-
tainability Reporting Guidelines is a proxy repre-
senting CSR variable. Formula of Tobin's Q is used 
as a proxy for corporate value. 
 
b. Population and Sample 
The population concerns the companies engaged 
in: (1) extractive, i.e. agriculture sector and mining 
sector, (2) manufacturing, i.e. basic industry and 
chemical sector, miscellaneous industry sector, and 
consumer goods industry sector; (3) non-
manufacturing, i.e. property and real estate sector, 
and transportation and infrastructure sector. The 
sampling of this study is using purposive sampling 
method (Table 1), i.e. sampling based on certain 
criteria. There are about 26 companies or in two 
years there are 52 companies that will be taken as 
the sample. 
 
c. Research Variables and Operational Definition 
Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure (X1) 
CSR disclosure is measured by using proxy of Cor-
porate Social Responsibility Index (CSRI) based on 
indicators existing in the GRI G3 Sustainability Re-
Table 1 
Sample Criteria 
 Sample Criteria Number of Companies 
Companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange during two consecutive years 2009 – 2010. 237 
Companies’ Annual Reports from 2009 to 2010 which cannot be accessed or obtained from 
company’s website or website IDX. 
(142) 
Companies which do not have their own sustainability report (SR) or CSR report in 
adequate annual report from 2009 to 2010. 
(27) 
Non existence or incomplete companies’ data  (42) 
Number of companies 26 
Number of companies during 2 years  52 
Number of companies after normality test during 2 years  42 
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porting Guidelines. This guidance consists of 3 in-
dicators with 79 disclosure items in it coupled with 
eleven special items for mining sector and 24 spe-
cific items for telecommunication sub-sector. The 
approach to calculate CSR disclosure basically uses 
dichotomy approach, i.e. each item of CSRI is given 
value of 1 if disclosed, and value of 0 if it is not 
disclosed. Each item is summed to obtain the over-
all score for each company. 
Corporate Social Responsibility Index (CSRI) is 
calculated using formula (Rustiarini (2010): 
j
ij
ij n
X
CSRI ∑=  (1) 
Description: 
CSRIij : Corporate Social Responsibility Index of 
firm j year i 
Nj : Number of items for firm j ∑ ijX  : Number of items disclosed by firm j for 
year i 
 
Corporate Governance (X2) 
Corporate governance variable is proxied by using: 
Managerial ownership (X2.1), measured by the per-
centage of stock ownership held by board of direc-
tors board of commissioners divided by the num-
ber of stocks outstanding. 
Institutional ownership (X2.2), measured by the per-
centage of stock ownership held by banks, insur-
ance companies, pension funds, mutual funds, and 
other institutions divided by the total number of 
stocks outstanding. 
Board size (X2.3), is all members of commissioners 
existing in the board in a company. 
Proportion of independent directors (X2.4), meas-
ured by the percentage of independent directors in 
the board members. 
 
Corporate Value (Y) 
The corporate value proxied by Tobin’s Q is calcu-
lated using the following formula (Jo dan Harjoto, 
2011): 
TA
DEBTMVEsQTobin +='  (2) 
Description: 
MVE  = Market Value of Equity 
DEBT = Current Liabilities + Long term Liabilities 
– (Current Assests – Inventory) 
TA = Total Assets 
 
d. Method of Data Analysis 
The data analysis method of this study refers to 
previous research, Rustiarini (2010), i.e. includes 
the factor analysis, descriptive statistics, and re-
gression analysis. Factor analysis is used to reduce 
the four proxies of corporate governance, namely 
managerial ownership, institutional ownership, 
board size, and the proportion of independent di-
rectors into a single factor, i.e. corporate govern-
ance. Factor analysis is using confirmary factor 
analysis, i.e. factor analysis which is used to con-
firm whether a construct, which is theoretically has 
been established, can be confirmed by its empiori-
cal data (Rustiarini, 2010). Furthermore, the vari-
ables of corporate social responsibility, corporate 
governance, and Tobin's q will be analyzed using 
descriptive statistics. Descriptive statistics describes 
the value of minimum, maximum, mean, and stan-
dard deviation of the three variables used in this 
study. 
Before conducting regression analysis, classi-
cal assumption test is conducted by using normal-
ity test, multicollinearity test, and heteroscedastic-
ity test. Regression models used to test the moder-
ating variable is the absolute value of the differ-
ence test model. The selection of the absolute 
value of the difference test in this study is because 
this model has smaller risk of multicollinearity 
than the method of interaction. This model also 
includes main effect variables in the regression 
analysis. Eliminating the main effects causes inter-
action coefficient results biased toward significant 
direction, and thus eliminating significance of the 
interaction effect (Thohiri, 2012). Regression 
analysis of absolute difference test is conducted by 
regressing the absolute difference variable stan-
darized with variable which is hypothesized as 
standarized moderating variables (Suliyanto, 
2011:218). The interaction between corporate gov-
ernance variable and moderating variable uses the 
absolute value of difference between the two vari-
ables. 
Y= α+ β1ZCSRI+ β2ZCG+ β3AbsCSRI-ZCG + e (3) 
Description: 
Y : Firm Value 
α : Constants 
β1-β3 : Regression Coefficient 
ZCSRI : Standardized Corporate Social Responsi-
bility Index 
ZCG : Standardized Corporate Governance 
AbsCSRI - CG : |CSRI-ZCG| 
 
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
a. Factor Analysis 
This factor analysis will result in the score of factor 
to confirm corporate governance variable which 
will be used in regression analysis. To perform fac-
tor analysis, the four variables such as managerial 
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ownership (MO), institutional ownership (IO), 
board size (BSIZE), and the proportion of inde-
pendent directors (indir), must first meet two as-
sumptions required, namely the adequacy of data 
or sample and the correlation between the variables 
tested. The testing of data and sample adequacy in 
factor analysis is using two measures, namely anti-
image matrices and Kaiser Maiyer Olkin. 
The testing of anti-image matrices indicates 
that MO MSA value is 0.514; MSA IO value is 0.506; 
BSIZE is 0.474, and INDIR is 0.674. BSIZE variable 
could not be used again in the subsequent analysis 
because MSA BSIZE value is smaller than the cutoff 
value of 0.5. Factor analysis will be repeated, so the 
only remaining variables which have MSA values 
greater than 0.5. In the second testing of anti-image 
matrices, the results obtained indicate that MSA 
MO is 0.544; IO is 0539, and INDIR is 0.660. The 
second testing results show that MSA value of each 
variable remaining is greater than 0.5, which means 
it meets the requirements of data or sample ade-
quacy. 
The analysis is turned to Kaiser Meiyer Olkin 
(KMO) and Bartlett's test. The purpose of KMO test 
is the same as anti-image matrices test, i.e. to de-
termine whether all of the data that have been 
fetched are enough to be factored. The test results 
showed that KMO value is 0.556 greater than 0.5, 
while the results of the Bartlett test showed that 
among variables of MO, IO, and INDIR have met 
the assumptions correlated, i.e.  by looking at the 
significant value of 0.03 which is smaller than the 
specified significance of 0. 05. Either KMO value or 
MSA value has already qualified adequacy of the 
required data. This means that one of the assump-
tions for continuing the process of factor analysis 
has been met. The test results of factor analysis can 
be seen in Table 2. 
 
b. Descriptive Statistics 
The result of Descriptive Statistics Test (Table 3) 
shows that the variable of corporate social respon-
sibility (CSR) disclosure has maximum value of 1 
and minimum value of 0.14, with mean value of 
Table 2 
Factor Analysis 
Anti-Image Matrices 1 
  MO IO BSIZE INDIR 
MO .781 .289 .262 -.050 
IO .289 .845 .088 .133 
BSIZE .262 .088 .896 .049 
Anti-image Covariance 
INDIR -.050 .133 .049 .958 
MO .514a .355 .314 -.058 
IO .355 .506a .101 .148 
BSIZE .314 .101 .474a .053 
Anti-image Correlation 
INDIR -.058 .148 .053 .674a 
a. Measures of Sampling Adequacy (MSA) 
 
Anti-image Matrices 2 
  MO IO INDIR 
MO .866 .294 -.071 
IO .294 .854 .130 
Anti-image Covariance 
INDIR -.071 .130 .961 
MO .544a .342 -.078 
IO .342 .539a .143 
Anti-image Correlation 
INDIR -.078 .143 .660a 
a. Measures of Sampling Adequacy (MSA) 
 
KMO ad Bartlett’s Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .556 
Approx. Chi-Square 8.709 
Df 3 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Sig. .033 
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0.448 and standard deviation of 0.251. This result 
shows that the disclosure of corporate social re-
sponsibility of companies listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange from one to seven sectors are still 
in edequate categories becauser the range is below 
0.5 even though disclosure of corporate social re-
sponsibility has been an obligation for any public 
company. 
The corporate value variable which is meas-
ured using Tobin's q indicates minimum value of 
0.16 and maximum value of 7.53, with mean value 
of 1.669 and standard deviation of 1.485. The corpo-
rate main value of 1.669 indicates that the corporate 
value which is made as the sample is good enough, 
i.e.  above one. The value above one indicates the 
average sample firms generate higher profits than 
investment expenditure, so that it can stimulate 
new investment. 
 
c. Classical Assumption Test Uji 
Normality Test 
The result of normality test using the initial sample 
consisting of 52 sample companies indicates prob-
ability value Asymp.Sig (2-tailed) the corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) disclosure, corporate 
governance (CG), and corporate value (Tobin's q) 
respectively of 0.025; 0.150, and 0.044 (Table 4). 
From the test result, there are two variables which 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistic 
Descriptive Statistic 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
CSR 52 .14 1.00 .4483 .25119 
TOBINSQ 52 .16 7.53 1.6696 1.48542 
REGR factor score 1 for analysis 1 52 -1.22323 3.10170 .0000000 1.00000000 
Valid N (listwise) 52     
 
Table 4 
Normality Test 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 1 
  CSR (X1) CG (X2) TOBINS Q (Y) 
N 52 52 52 
Mean .4483 .0001 1.6696 Normal Parametersa,,b 
Std. Deviation .25119 .99993 1.48542 
Absolute .205 .158 .191 
Positive .205 .158 .191 
Most Extreme Differences 
Negative -.135 -.111 -.161 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1.481 1.138 1.379 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .025 .150 .044 
a. Test distribution is Normal. 
b. Calculated from data. 
 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 2 
  CSR (X1) CG (X2) TOBINSQ (Y) 
N 42 42 42 
Mean .4005 -.2794 1.4248 Normal Parametersa,,b 
Std. Deviation .22361 .72235 .97062 
Absolute .203 .135 .171 
Positive .203 .135 .171 
Most Extreme Differences 
Negative -.151 -.102 -.125 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1.317 .875 1.109 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .062 .428 .171 
a. Test distribution is Normal. 
b. Calculated from data. 
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are not distributed normally, i.e. corporate social 
responsibility disclosure variable (X1) and the cor-
porate value variable or Tobin's q (Y), each of 
which has a Asymp.Sig probability value (2-tailed) 
of 0.025 and 0.044. The variables which are not dis-
tributed normally can be transformed in order to be 
normal. The simplest way is by removing outlier 
data. 
The result of second phase normality test is 
using the remaining 42 samples. After conducting 
normality test on the remaining 42 samples, nor-
mality data can be seen by comparing probability 
value of Asymp.Sig probability (2-tailed). Each 
Asymp.Sig value (2-tailed) of variables of corpo-
rate social responsibility disclosure or CSR (X1), 
corporate governance or CG (X2), and the corpo-
rate value or Tobin's q (Y) is 0.062; 0.428, and 
0.171. The statistics result shows that all As-
ymp.Sig probability value (2-tailed) of the studied 
variables are greater than 0.05. Thus, it can be con-
cluded that the sample data has been distributed 
normally. 
Multicolinearity Test 
The result of multicollinearity test (Table 5) shows 
that the tolerance values of corporate social respon-
sibility disclosure (CSR), corporate governance 
(CG), and the interaction variable (CSR_CG) re-
spectively at 0.648; 0.726, and 0.501. VIF values of 
the three independent variables respectively at 
1,543; 1.378, and 1.998. Based on the result of the 
test, it can be seen that the tolerance values of the 
three independent variables are greater than 0.10, 
while the VIF values of the three variables are less 
than ten. Therefore, it can be concluded there is no 
multicollinearity among the independent variables. 
 
Heteroscedasticity Test 
Glejser test is used to test whether there is hetero-
scedasticity in this regression model. When the 
significant values are above 0.05, it can be con-
cluded that there is no heteroscedasticity. The re-
sult of heteroscedasticity test (Table 6) shows that 
the significant value of corporate social responsibil-
ity disclosure (CSR), corporate governance (CG), 
Table 5 
Multicolinearity Test 
Coefficientsa 
Collinearity Statistics Model 
Tolerance VIF 
Zscore(CSR) .648 1.543 
Zscore(CG) .726 1.378 
1 
AbsCSR_CG .501 1.998 
a. Dependent Variable: TOBINSQ 
 
Table 6 
Heteroscedasticity Test 
Coefficientsa 
Unstandardized Coefficients Std. Coefficients Model 
B Std. Error Beta 
t Sig. 
(Constant) .746 .150  4.988 .000 
Zscore(CSR) -7.084E-6 .098 .000 .000 1.000 
Zscore(CG) .153 .093 .301 1.648 .108 
1 
AbsCSR_CG -.159 .136 -.257 -1.166 .251 
a. Dependent Variable: AbsRes_1 
 
Table 7 
Coefficient of Correlation 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .584a .341 .289 .81866 
a. Predictors: (Constant), AbsCSR_CG, Zscore(CG), Zscore(CSR) 
b. Dependent Variable: TOBINSQ 
 
The Indonesian Accounting Review Vol. 4, No. 1, January 2014, pages 1 – 14 
9 
and interaction variable (CSR_CG) respectively at 
1,000; 0.108, and 0.251. The significant values of this 
three variables are greater than 0.05. Thus, it can be 
concluded that in this regression model there is no 
heteroscedasticity. 
 
d. Hypothesis Test 
The hypothesis test with multiple regressions 
involving moderating variable is conducted by 
using absolute difference value test. The correla-
tion coefficient (R) indicates the degree of corre-
lation between the independent and dependent 
variables. Based on the result of statistics test, 
correlation coefficients (Table 7) shows a value of 
0.584 which indicates that the degree of correla-
tion between the independent and dependent 
variables are 58.4 percent. Thus, it can be con-
cluded that coefficient of the disclosure of corpo-
rate social responsibility, corporate governance, 
and interaction variables have a strong enough 
relationship with the corporate value due to the 
correlation coefficient value which is greater than 
50 percent. 
The coefficient of determination (adjusted R 
square) indicates a value of 0.289. This means that 
28.9 percent of the changes in the corporate value 
can be explained by the changes of the disclosure of 
corporate social responsibility, corporate govern-
ance, and interaction variables, while the remain-
der, amounting to 71.1 percent is explained by 
other variables outside the model of this study. 
F test is conducted to test whether all inde-
pendent variables included in the model have si-
multaneous effect on the dependent variable. Based 
on ANOVA test or F test (Table 8) obtained F value 
of 6.545 with significant value of 0.001. Significant 
value of 0.001 is smaller than 0.05. Thus, it can be 
concluded that the regression coefficient of the cor-
porate social responsibility disclosure, corporate 
governance, and interaction variables is not equal 
to zero or the three variables simultaneously affect 
the corporate value. 
Table 8 
F Test 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 13.158 3 4.386 6.545 .001a 
Residual 25.468 38 .670   
1 
Total 38.626 41    
a. Predictors: (Constant), AbsCSR_CG, Zscore(CG), Zscore(CSR) 
b. Dependent Variable: TOBINSQ 
 
Table 9 
t test 
Coefficientsa 
Unstandardized Coefficients Std. Coefficients Model 
B Std. Error Beta 
t Sig. 
(Constant) 1.555 .243  6.412 .000 
Zscore(CSR) .377 .159 .388 2.372 .023 
Zscore(CG) .443 .150 .457 2.954 .005 
1 
AbsCSR_CG -.139 .221 -.117 -.629 .533 
a. Dependent Variable: TOBINSQ 
 
Table 10 
Descriptive Statistic Test of Corporate Governance 
Descriptive Statistic Test of Corporate Governance Variable 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
MO 42 .00 .75 .0289 .11872 
IO 42 .14 .99 .6424 .25030 
INDIR 42 .00 1.00 .2971 .24996 
Valid N (listwise) 42     
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e. Discussion 
The Effect of Corporate Social Responsibility 
Disclosure on the Corporate Value 
The result of statistics test shows that corporate 
social responsibility disclosure affects the corporate 
value. This is demonstrated in the t test significant 
value (Table 9) of 0.023 is smaller than 0.05 and a 
coefficient value of 0.377. This means that any in-
crease in variable of corporate social responsibility 
disclosure by 1 percent, the variable of corporate 
value will increase by 37.7 percent, assuming that 
other variables are constant. This means that the 
first hypothesis is accepted. 
The results of this study are consistent with the 
researches by Almilia and Vitello (2007) , Rustiarini 
(2010) , Mackey and Barney (2007) , Rossi (2009) , Jo 
and Harjoto (2011) , and Thohiri (2012) which state 
that corporate social responsibility disclosure af-
fects the corporate value . The implementation and 
the disclosure corporate social responsibility affect 
the corporate value because, at present, the man-
agement is aware of the importance meaning of 
corporate social responsibility as a long term in-
vestment that can maintain the continuity of the 
company. Good faith of the company by trying to 
minimize the impact of operations on the surround-
ing environment, building good relationships with 
stakeholders, conducting efficiency while maintain-
ing the quality of the product, and then disclosing 
corporate social responsibility appropriately, both 
in the annual report and sustainability report have 
become a signal and receive positive response, thus 
attracting the interest of investors to invest in the 
company. 
The result of this study is not consistent with 
the study conducted by Nurlela and Islahuddin 
(2008) which states that the implementation and the 
disclosure of corporate social responsibility by 
companies are not the factors that determine 
whether the corporate value is good or bad. 
 
The Effect of Corporate Governance on the Firm 
Value 
The result of statistics test shows that corporate 
governance affects corporate value. This is indi-
cated by the t test significance value of 0.005 which 
is smaller than 0.05 and coefficient value of 0.443. 
This means that any increase in corporate govern-
ance variable by 1 percent, the corporate value 
variable will increase by 44.3 percent, assuming 
other variables are constant. This means that the 
second hypothesis is accepted. 
The result of this study is consistent with the 
studies by Thomsen (2004), Coleman (2007), Her-
awaty (2008), Susanti (2010), Rustiarini (2010), 
Ammann et al. (2011), Shil (2011), and Thohiri 
(2012) which state that corporate governance affects 
corporate value. Most of the previous studies found 
that corporate governance affects the performance 
and the value of the company, regardless of the 
method or corporate governance items studied. The 
result of this study is not consistent with the study 
by Herdinata (2007) which states that corporate 
governance practices have no significant effect on 
the corporate value. 
Corporate governance affects the corporate 
value because it is the system that regulates and 
controls the company (FCGI, 2001), maintains the 
continuity of the relationship between the firm and 
its shareholders and stakeholders. The sustainabil-
ity of this relationship depends on any policies is-
sued by the firm, especially in relation to the inter-
ests of shareholders and stakeholders. The policies 
can be associated with (1) the distribution of the 
rights and obligations of the firm officials; (2) the 
presence or absence of stock ownership of manage-
rial and institutional; (3) the presence or absence of 
independent officials either in controlling or deci-
sion-making, (4) the number of members in the 
board of commissioners; (5) the prresence of audit 
committee; (6) corporate social responsibility; (7) 
and so on. All these things can be taken into con-
sideration for the investors to invest in the firm. 
The more investors invest in the company, the 
higher the price of the firm stocks in the market, 
which means that the corporate value is increasing. 
All of this is expected to reduce the negative impact 
of agency theory. 
 
The Effect of Corporate Governance on the Rela-
tionship between the Corporate Social Responsi-
bility Disclosure and the Corporate Value 
The result of statistics test shows that corporate 
governance does not have significant effect on the 
relationship between the corporate social respon-
sibility disclosure and the corporate value. This is 
indicated by the t-test significant value of 0.533 
which is greater than 0.05 and a coefficient value 
of -0.139. The interaction between corporate gov-
ernance, as a moderating variable, on the relation-
ship between the corporate social responsibility 
disclosure and the corporate value shows signifi-
cant result in statistics test. Thus, in this study, 
corporate governance variable is not a variable 
that can affect the relationship between corporate 
social responsibility disclosure and corporate 
value. This means that the third hypothesis is re-
jected. 
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In theory, corporate social responsibility has 
nothing to do with corporate governance for cor-
porate social responsibility is one of implementa-
tion activities of corporate governance. This is 
stated in one of the principles of corporate gov-
ernance, namely the principle of responsibility 
which states that the company must carry out its 
responsibility towards society and the environ-
ment, so it can maintain long-term business sus-
tainability. 
The result of this study is not consistent with 
the previous study. Rustiarini (2010) stated that 
good implementation of corporate governance en-
courages the company to implement corporate so-
cial responsibility activities, so as to enhance the 
company's reputation. Ammann et al. (2011) found 
a strong and positive relationship between the level 
of corporate governance with corporate social be-
havior and the corporate value. Jo and Harjoto 
(2011) stated that corporate social responsibility is 
triggered by characteristics, corporate governance, 
and company monitoring mechanisms that will 
ultimately affect the corporate value. 
In this study, corporate governance is not a 
variable that may moderate the relationship be-
tween corporate social responsibility and the cor-
porate value because the effect of corporate gov-
ernance variables selected is less significant to the 
disclosure of corporate social responsibility within 
the company. This study is re-using descriptive 
statistics test to see the mean value of each variable 
which becomes an indicator of corporate govern-
ance (Table 10). 
The corporate governance is not a variable that 
may moderate the relationship between corporate 
social responsibility and the value of the company 
because the influence of corporate governance vari-
ables selected is less significant to the disclosure of 
corporate social responsibility within the company. 
This study re-using descriptive statistic tests to see 
the mean value of each variable is an indicator of 
corporate governance (Table 10). 
The role of unaffiliated directors is still a bit in 
the company, i.e. only 29.7 percent, it can be con-
cluded that it is still rare for companies in Indone-
sia to have unafffiliated directors in the company, 
whereas one of the roles of unaffiliated directors 
represent the interests of minority shareholders 
and stakeholders in the company decision-
making. Managerial ownership in the company is 
still fairly low, at only 2.8 percent in the 42 sample 
companies while the average institutional owner-
ship in the 42 sample companies is quite high, at 
64.24 percent. This means that even though a 
sense of ownership of the executives / directors is 
still very less, so the performance of the manage-
ment is not maximal in increasing shareholder / 
corporate value, but with the presence of high 
institutional ownership, monitoring on the per-
formance of the company, in this case the per-
formance of directors is also increasing. 
Research conducted by Barnea and Rubin 
(2005) states that corporate social responsibility is a 
source of conflict among the different owners. They 
found that managerial ownership negatively affects 
the company's corporate social responsibility while 
institutional ownership has no effect on corporate 
social responsibility. Pakpahan (2011) also stated 
that managerial ownership negatively affects cor-
porate social responsibility, while institutional 
ownership has no significant effect on corporate 
social responsibility. These results reject the third 
hypothesis. 
 
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUGGES-
TION, AND LIMITATIONS 
In general, it can be inferred as the following. 
Corporate social responsibility affects the corporate 
value. This is due to the awareness of the manage-
ment of long-term investments contained in corpo-
rate social responsibility and the company’s con-
cern for the environment and the interests of the 
stakeholders around the scope of operations. All 
these have become a signal and received positive 
response from investors. 
Corporate governance affects the corporate value. 
This is also due to the corporate governance which 
is the system that keeps the sustainability of the 
relationship between the company and its share-
holders and stakeholders. The sustainability of 
this relationship depends on the policies taken by 
the company related to the interests of the share-
holders and stakeholders. The policies could be 
related to many things, such as (1) the distribution 
of the rights and obligations of the company offi-
cials, (2) the presence or absence of managerial or 
institutional stock ownership; (3) the presence or 
absence of independent officials who is independ-
ent both in terms of monitoring and decision-
making, (4) the existence of audit committee; (5) 
corporate social responsibility, (6) and so on. All 
these things can be taken into consideration for 
the investors to invest their capital in the com-
pany. The results of this study prove that agency 
theory becomes the foundation of corporate gov-
ernance implementation. By implementing good 
corporate governance, the emergence of agency 
problems can be minimized. 
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Corporate governance, as a moderating variable, in 
fact, does not have significant effect on the relation-
ship between corporate social responsibility disclo-
sure and corporate value. It is because corporate 
governance variables used still do not have signifi-
cant effect on the policy and corporate social re-
sponsibility disclosure, although in theory, corpo-
rate governance afffects corporate social responsi-
bility, because corporate social responsibility is one 
of the implementations of corporate governance 
activities. 
The researchers suggest that for future studies, 
the researcher should do as follows. 
They can take longer time span or the latest in or-
der to describe the real situation. 
They should add to corporate governance vari-
ables or replace the variables which have not or 
rarely been studied. The future sudies may use 
corporate governance index published by The 
Indonesian Institute for Corporate Governance 
(IICG). 
They also have to consider several variables that 
affect the corporate value to be used as moderating 
variables, such as return on asset, cash holding, 
dividend payout ratio, and investment opportu-
nity. 
This study itself has limitations that can be 
considered for further researches in order to obtain 
better results. The limitations are related to the fol-
lowing. 
The corporate governance variables reduced by 
factor analysis are only four, i.e. managerial owner-
ship, institutional ownership, board size, and the 
proportion of independent directors. And, the 
board size should eventually be excluded in this 
study because it has no correlation with the other 
three items. 
This study re-uses corporate governance as moder-
ating variables. 
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